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Third, the imputation of knowledge would not be necessary to protect the
rights of the third person in the present case, for the third person knew that
the manager was attempting to use corporate assets to pay his private obliga-
tions. This, it seems, should be sufficient to show that the third person was
not entitled to the benefit of the imputation even though he was not actually
participating in a scheme to defraud the corporation.12
In the present case, the court relies on and quotes extensively from the
case of Seymour Improvement Co. v. Fiking Sprinkler Co.,13 which case is
easily distinguished. In the Viking case, the president executed the contract
for the installation of the sprinkler system and bills were sent from time to
time as the work progressed. The directors could hardly escape having
knowledge of the installation and that the corporation was looked to for
payment. Further, the president and secretary were acting in good faith
and their knowledge, therefore, could be imputed to the corporation. Also,
the third party was acting in such a way as to be entitled to protection, and
the corporation received the benefits of the contract. The court relied, also,
on the case of Hoosier Lumber Co. v. Spear.14 The facts in the Spear case
were almost identical with those of the principal case: the president of the
corporation in each case was paying a personal debt with the corporate
assets. However, in the Spear case, it was shown that both of the other
directors, the president being the third, had knowledge of and agreed to the
contract, though no formal resolution was adopted. The court further found
that the officers believed the agreement to be for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. Thus, it would appear that, while the court announced rules of law
which are generally accepted, the rules thus announced are inapplicable to
the facts of the instant case.
R. E. M.
TAXATION-JURISDICTION TO TAX TRUST PROPERTY-THE TRUST DEVICE AS
AN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR AvOIDING TAxATION.-Appellant, a resident of Indi-
ana, assigned, transferred, and delivered certain stocks to the First National
Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, on February 28, 1930, to be held in trust, naming
herself, her husband, daughters, sons-in-law, or their survivors, as bene-
ficiaries. The intangible subject matter of the trust was made the basis of an
assessment against the appellant, and was listed on the tax duplicate in July,
1932, as omitted property for the years 1920 to 1932, inclusive.
Held: Since the title vested in the trustee, who was a resident of Ohio,
the property cannot be made the subject of a tax by the state of Indiana.
Since the appellant did, in fact, part with title to, and control of, the property,
her object in so doing, although one of avoiding taxation, is of no importance.1
12 Persons contracting with a corporation are bound to know the law limit-
ing the powers of its agents to contract. Pine Civil Township v. Huber
Manufacturing Co. (1882), 83 Ind. 121.
13 (1927), 87 Ind. App. 179, 161 N. E. 389.
14 (1934), 99 Ind. App. 532, 189 N. E. 633.
1 Lewis R. Johnston v. State of Indiana (Ind., 1937), 8 N. E. (2d) 590.
RECENT CASE NOTES
That intangible property held in trust is regarded as being subject to
taxation by the jurisdiction in which the trustee is domiciled, there seems to
be little doubt.2
Upon the question of whether or not the domicile of the beneficiary could
likewise levy a property tax upon the corpus of the trust there was, until
recently, a considerable split of authority. The courts of a number of states,3
led by Massachusetts with Hunt v. Perry,4 have upheld the right of the
domicile of the cestui in this matter, while on the other hand, the courts of
Florida,5 California,6 Arkansas, 7 and Rhode Islands have deemed the double
taxation resulting from such a holding sufficiently undesirable to require a
contrary declaration of law.
The necessity of weighing the merits of the two lines of decisions for the
purpose of determining which represents the most nearly correct and desirable
result to be reached in the present case is obviated by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia.9 In
this case the court held that where the possessor of the legal title held the
securities in Maryland, the situs for purposes of taxation was there, and they
could not be taxed by.Virginia, the domicile of the cestui que trustent. The
court was cautious to limit its decision to the exact problem before it, spe-
cifically stating that it was not deciding the right of the state to tax the cestui
upon his equitable interest, but only its right to tax him upon the corpus of the
trust. As the decision in its limited scope squarely covers the question involved
in the principal case, however, there can be little doubt as to the correctness
of the holding of the Indiana Supreme Court that Safe Deposit and Trust Co.
v. Virginia was controlling, and that the property was therefore not taxable
by Indiana.
Although there are in Indiana both legislativelO and judicialll declara-
tions of policy which render ineffective attempts to avoid taxation by the
conversion of taxable property into non-taxable property, it is to be noted that
2 I Cooley on Taxation, 4th Edition, sees. 469-470; State v. Bearsley
(1919), 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794; Higgins v. Commonwealth (1907), 126 Ky.
211, 103 S. W. 306; Welch v. Boston (1915), 221 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174;
Detroit v. Lewis (1896), 109 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 958; State v. Clark (1899),
77 Minn. 190, 79 N. W. 829; People v. Wells (1907), 188 App. Div. 881, 103
N. Y. 8. 874; West Chester School District v. Darlington (1861), 38 Pa. 157.
For a complete treatment of the problem of taxation of trust property, see
Robert C. Brown, the Taxation of Trust Property, 23 Kentucky L Jl. 403.
3 Maryland, (McCeney v. County Commissioners (1927), 153 Md. 25, 137
A. 291); Maine, (Augusta v. Kimball (1898), 91 Me. 605, 40 A. 666); Ken-
tucky, (Lexington v. Fishback (1901), 109 Ky. 770, 60 S. W. 727); Ohio,
(Tafel v. Lewis (1906), 75 Ohio St. 182, 78 N. E. 1003) ; Pennsylvania, (Lewis
v. Chester (1869), 60 Pa. 325); New Hampshire, (Crossley v. Charleston
(1915), 78 N. H. 39, 95 A. 1043); Nebraska, (In re Douglas County (1909),
84 Neb. 506, 121 N. W. 593).
4 (1896), 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103.
5 State v. Beardsley, supra, note 2.
6 Lowery v. Los Angeles County, 38 Cal. App. 158, 175 P. 702 (1918)."
7 Greene County v. Smith (1921), 148 Ark. 33, 228 S. W. 738.
8 Anthony v. Caswell (1885), 15 R. I. 159, 1 A. 290.
9 (1929), 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59.
10 Burns 1933, Secs. 64-605 and 64-608.
11 Burham v. State (1892), 6 Ind. App. 23, 32 N. E. 104.
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neither the statutes nor the cases are concerned with a transfer of property to
persons outside the taxing jurisdiction of the state. Perhaps the explanation
of this failure to include transfers of the latter type is that the state could,
until the decision in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Firginia, tax the property
so transferred, and it was therefore unnecessary to safeguard the revenue
from such attempted evasions.
As an abstract statement of law, the holding of the court in the principal
case on the question of transfers to avoid taxation leaves much to be desired.
The holding, if strictly adhered to, would, except for the Intangibles Tax
act of 1933,12 the constitutionality of which was upheld by a divided Indiana
Supreme Court,13 subject the state revenue to tax evasion which would be
seriously detrimental to state interests. Transfers of intangible property to
trustees domiciled in states having favorable tax rates would limit Indiana to
the taxation of the equitable interest retained, 1 4 if not preclude it from all
property taxation whatsoever.15
Viewed, however, as it must be, in the light of the facts of the principal
case, it seems much less onerous. The transfer was not, from all indications,
one which was to be nullified by a return immediately after the tax day.
While there might seem to be reasons for suspecting such a scheme, the actual
facts indicate otherwise, and it thus becomes necessary to consider the trans-
action as being one in which the taxpayer, although possibly attempting to
obtain a more favorable tax rate at the same time, made a perfectly legal
and good-faith transfer to a non-resident trustee, and the fact that in so
doing she obtained a more favorable tax rate, and placed the intangibles out-
side the right of Indiana, does not vitiate the transaction.
R. W. W.
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-TERM OF CONTRACT WHEN No DEFINITE
TIME IS SPECIFIED.-The defendant through its agent by telephone called the
plaintiff offering the plaintiff a position in its legal department. During the
conversation the defendant's agent informed the plaintiff that, "This job pays
a salary of $2,600 per annum, which figures out something like $50 per week."
The defendant's agent wished for the plaintiff to come to work immediately,
but the plaintiff asked for time to consider. The next day, November 4, 1930,
he telegraphed his acceptance and that he would be at work Monday,
November 11th. The plaintiff left his position in Cleveland to enter the
employment of the defendant in Indianapolis, but was discharged on July 14,
1931. The plaintiff contends that there was a contract of hiring for a year
and that the defendant breached same when it discharged him before the end
of the year. Held, there was a contract of employment from November 4,
12 Burns 1933, Secs. 64-901 ff.
13 Lutz v. Arnold (1935), 208 Ind. 480, 193 N. E. 840.
14 Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra, note 9.
15 Baltimore v. Gibbs (1934), 166 Md. 364, 171 A. 37. This case is com-
mented upon favorably by Robert C. Brown, supra, note 2, and adversely
criticized in Developments in the Law, Taxation-1933, 47 Harvard L Rev.
1224.
